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BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: THE NEED FOR SOCIAL  
FOR-PROFIT ENTITY LEGISLATION IN NORTH DAKOTA 
ABSTRACT 
 
The benefit corporation is an emerging type of business entity that 
allows for-profit companies to consider social consequences in company 
decision-making processes.  In April 2010, Maryland became the first state 
to pass benefit corporation legislation.  Since then, thirty-one states, 
including Delaware, have passed similar legislation.  Despite North 
Dakota’s uniquely shareholder-friendly laws, the state legislature has yet to 
adopt benefit corporation legislation.  Creating a business entity that 
modifies traditional notions about corporations would create some business 
and legal uncertainty; however, there may be a need for a business form that 
is unrestrained by the existing wealth maximization corporate model.  
Given the surge in capital investment and economic activity in North 
Dakota, the following note will explain why the state should consider 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2012, the Reputation Institute, a private global consulting firm 
headquartered in New York, conducted a research project inviting 47,000 
consumers from across fifteen markets to participate in a study that ranked 
the world’s one hundred most reputable companies.1  The study showed 
that a person’s willingness to buy, work for, and invest in companies is 
predominantly based on perceptions of the company over perceptions of the 
product.2  In the wake of large corporate scandals like Enron3 and 
WorldCom,4 it should come as no surprise that consumers, employees, and 
investors make decisions based on a company’s corporate social 
responsibility practices.  Although theories of corporate social 
responsibility and social entrepreneurship are not novel, there is an upswing 
 
1. Jacquelyn Smith, The Companies with the Best CSR Reputations, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2012/12/10/the-companies-with-the-best-csr-
reputations/3/. 
2. Id.  (explaining that willingness to buy is sixty percent based on the perception of the 
corporation and only forty percent based on the perception of the product). 
3. See generally Enron:  The Real Scandal, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 19. 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/940091 (detailing how Enron, the Texas-based energy-trading 
company, declared bankruptcy as a result of poor corporate governance and lack of corporate 
social responsibility). 
4. See generally The Great Telecoms Crash, THE ECONOMIST (July 18, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1234886 (explaining how WorldCom, the long distance phone 
company now known as MCI, filed for bankruptcy due to corporate executives inflating company 
assets).  
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in demand for socially responsible products, employers, and investment 
opportunities as a result of continued public scandal.5 
TOMS, a shoes company, is one among several notable social 
enterprises created in response to this demand.  Founder Blake Mycoskie 
created TOMS in 2006 after being inspired by children in Argentina 
without shoes.6  He created a for-profit corporation matching every pair of 
shoes purchased with a donated pair of new shoes for a child in need.  
Through a partnership with National Relief Charities, TOMS has donated 
shoes to children living in federal Indian reservations, including 
reservations in North Dakota.7  The Body Shop, a subsidiary of L’Oreal, is 
another noteworthy example of a socially conscious corporation.8  The 
Body Shop’s core competencies include positive environmental practices, 
using trade products, defending human rights, and campaigning against 
animal testing.9  Having recognized the difficulties faced by corporations 
pursuing social missions, The Body Shop has voluntarily implemented 
social auditing practices to increase their social accountability.10  Other 
companies, like TOMS, have opted in favor of creating for-profit 
corporations with  
non-profit subsidiaries to circumvent the limitations of being a corporation 
with a social mission.11  Others still have taken a different approach, 
rejecting for-profit corporations entirely in favor of not-for-profit entities.  
These companies argue that the traditional corporate purpose of shareholder 
wealth maximization embedded in the concept of a corporation is “wholly 
incompatible” with social and charitable missions.12 
Most scholars find themselves ideologically somewhere in the middle.  
They acknowledge that the corporate form limits the ability of companies to 
achieve social missions, but applaud company-initiated programs like social 
audits and not-for-profit subsidiaries.  Regardless of variations along the 
ideological spectrum, all socially conscious groups continue to lobby for the 
 
5. Nate Holzapfel, The Rise of Social Entrepreneurship, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 
2014 11:00 AM), http://www huffingtonpost.com/nate-holzapfel/the-rise-of-social-
entrep_b_6304280 html. 
6. One-For-One, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/one-for-one-en. 
7. Kelly Gibson, TOMS Shoes Giving Partners, NAT’L RELIEF CHARITIES BLOG (Feb. 12, 
2012), http://blog.nrcprograms.org/toms-shoes-giving-partners/. 
8. Our Company, THE BODY SHOP, http://www.thebodyshop.com/content/ 
services/aboutus_company.aspx. 
9.  Id. 
10. Social and Environmental Reporting, THE BODY SHOP, http://www.thebodyshop.com.au/ 
about-us/social-and-environmental-reporting.aspx. 
11. One-for-One, TOMS, http://www.toms.com. 
12. Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good:  Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ 
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 409, 411 (2002). 
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creation of business forms that better facilitate social entrepreneurship.  In 
thirty-one states,13 legislators have responded to these requests by creating 
public benefit corporations: a new type of business entity that allows for-
profit companies to prioritize social outcomes in  
decision-making.14  North Dakota is a state that has yet to adopt public 
benefit corporation legislation.15  Therefore, the purposes of this note are 
twofold: to determine how this new business entity differs from traditional 
corporate law and to debate whether adopting legislation creating such an 
entity is a viable means of promoting corporate social responsibility in 
North Dakota. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In debating the need for a new legal entity, it is important to understand 
the evolution and shortcomings of traditional corporate law.  Two 
seemingly inconsistent conceptions exist regarding the purpose of the 
corporation.16  The first concept postulates that the “primary purpose of the 
corporation is to maximize share value for shareholders.”17  The second 
recognizes that corporations do not operate in a vacuum, and, as a result, are 
responsible for considering the concerns of constituents such as employees, 
customers, creditors, and the community.18  The former view is the more 
conventional of the two views and is known as the “shareholder primacy 
model.”19  The following section outlines the evolution of the model.  It 
also explains that while constituency statutes were enacted to address some 
 
13. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.benefitcorp net/state-by-state-legislative-status (listing states that have enacted Benefit 
Corporation legislation:  Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington D.C., and West 
Virginia). States that have introduced Benefit Corporation Legislation include: Alaska, Kentucky,  
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.  Id. 
14. What is a Benefit Corporation?, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.benefitcorp net. 
15. See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 13.  During the 64th Legislative 
Assembly of North Dakota, Representative Klemin introduced House Bill No. 1237, “A BILL for 
an Act to create and enact chapter 10-37 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to North 
Dakota public benefit corporations.”  See H.B. 1237, 64th Legis. Assemb., 64th Reg. Sess. (N.D. 
2015).  On January 27th, 2015, the House of Representatives passed the bill with 87 yeas and 6 
nays.  On March 24th, 2015, the Senate failed to pass the bill after a second reading with 2 yeas 
and 44 nays.  North Dakota Bill Actions:  HB 1237, NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, 
http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/64-2015/bill-actions/ba1237 html. 
16. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 430. 
17. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 216 
(2013). 
18. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 432.  
19. Id. at 430. 
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of the model’s shortcomings, these statutes have deficiencies of their own, 
perpetuating the need for additional legislation. 
A. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW 
The concept behind the shareholder primacy model is routed in both 
legal and economic principals.  Proponents argue that “shareholders are the 
property owners of the corporation and, therefore, are entitled to legal 
protection of their property—their invested capital.”20  Because directors 
hold shareholders’ property in trust, they owe fiduciary duties of undivided 
loyalty, care, and fair dealing.21  Other proponents of the shareholder 
primacy model base their theory on principals of contract law.  They argue 
that a corporation is “essentially a web of contractual relations forming a 
‘nexus of contracts.’”22  The relationship between a director and 
shareholder is contractual in nature and governed by principals of agency.23  
Implicit in the contract is an understanding that directors will perform their 
legal duty to promote shareholder interests, which is subordinate to other 
stakeholder concerns.24  Because shareholders have “relatively little 
external influence over the corporation,” some argue that it is appropriate 
for directors to protect shareholder interests above the interests of other 
constituent groups who have the ability to enter into and negotiate their own 
contracts.25  The view is argued as not only “descriptively accurate,” but 
also “normatively appropriate.”26 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.27 is a foundational case supporting the 
shareholder wealth maximization model.  In Dodge, shareholders brought 
suit after Henry Ford, founder and director of Ford Motor Company, 
refused to pay out shareholder dividends.28  Instead of issuing dividends, 
Ford intended to use corporate revenues to make cars more affordable for 
the public.29  The court refused to afford Henry Ford deference as a director 
of the corporation and ordered him to pay out shareholder dividends.30  The 
court used Ford’s statements regarding his altruistic intent to help his 
 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 430-31.  
22. Id. at 431. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 432.  
26. Id. 
27. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
28. Id. at 670. 
29. Id. at 671. 
30. Id. at 684-85.  
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workers and general consumers as evidence of a violation of his fiduciary 
duties to stockholders.31 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews Forbes Holdings is another landmark case 
supporting shareholder wealth maximization.32  In Revlon, the defendants 
sought to enjoin an agreement entered into by Revlon’s board of directors 
during a hostile takeover because it was not in the best interests of the 
shareholders.33  The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision to enjoin the agreement thereby establishing that a director’s duty 
is to maximize shareholder value, without regard to other constituencies, 
when a takeover of a company is inevitable.34 
B. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES 
In direct response to Revlon, several states have adopted constituency 
statutes that permit directors to consider non-shareholder interests.  In 
essence, directors are allowed to consider the interests of certain 
stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and the 
community when fulfilling their fiduciary duties.35  These statues help 
modernize the business judgement rule36 by explicitly protecting decisions 
that consider non-shareholder interests from derivative actions.37  Directors 
are protected even when their decisions seem to counter the traditional 
priority of shareholder wealth maximization.38  Some scholars argue that by 
adopting constituency statutes, the traditional shareholder maximization 
 
31. See, e.g., id.  at 671 (“My ambition, declared Mr. Ford, is to employ still more men; to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up 
their lives and their homes.  To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into 
the business.”)  (internal quotation marks omitted).  
32. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).  
33. Id. at 176.  
34. Id. at 182.  
35.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 971, 973-74 (1992). 
36. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the business 
judgment rule is a standard of judicial review employed by courts when they are asked to evaluate 
the business decisions made by corporate boards of directors.  It is a rebuttable presumption that 
corporate business decisions are made by disinterested directors, acting “on an informed basis, and 
in the good faith belief that the decisions are in the best interests of the” corporation and its 
shareholders.  Unless that presumption can be rebutted successfully by proving to the court that 
the directors violated their fiduciary duties and are therefore unable to claim the rule’s protection, 
a court will dismiss any lawsuit challenging a board’s business decision.). 
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (9th ed. 2009) (“A suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to 
enforce a right belonging to the fiduciary; esp., a suit asserted by a shareholder on the 
corporation’s behalf against a third party (usu. a corporate officer) because of the corporation’s 
failure to take some action against the third party.”). 
38. Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 989. 
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model has been abandoned.39  So far, thirty-one states have adopted some 
variation of these statutes with material differences among them.40  In 2007, 
North Dakota enacted a constituency statute as a part of the North Dakota 
Business Corporation Act.  The statute reads as follows: 
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, 
in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the 
interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and 
creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and 
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as the short-term 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the 
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued 
independence of the corporation.41 
While North Dakota’s constituency statute gives directors some 
protection in decision-making, it is not as encompassing as public benefit 
corporation legislation.  First, the language in the statute merely permits, 
but does not mandate, the consideration of non-shareholder interests.  It 
provides that a director “may”42 consider non-shareholder interests and that 
those who do are not necessarily in breach of director standards of conduct.  
Unlike public benefit legislation, North Dakota’s constituency statute does 
not require directors to consider non-shareholder interests nor does it 
include consequences for entities in breach of their social mandate and 
mission.  Therefore, whether and to what degree non-shareholder interests 
should be considered is left to the discretion of directors.  There is neither a 
legal requirement of directors to justify disregarding other stakeholders nor 
a need to justify only giving these interests a cursory review.  
Consequently, while the permissive language may protect directors, “it 
properly does not and should not vest rights, benefits, or even expectations 
in non-shareholders.”43 
 
39. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 277 (1992) (“[W]hat arguably is eradicated is the command . . . that 
maximizing the financial interests of shareholders through lawful means over some period of time 
is the core duty of a corporate director.”); see also Ronald M. Gree, Shareholders as Stakeholders: 
Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1409, 1412-14 (1993) 
(arguing that the passing of constituency statutes demonstrates the erosion of the traditional 
shareholder-primacy view).  
40. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2001); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2007); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2002). See also John Tyler, 
Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”:  A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties 
and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 131–38 (2010) (providing a detailed discussion of 
constituency statutes).  
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2013). 
42. Id.  
43. Tyler, supra note 40, at 134.  
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This permissive language is not unique to North Dakota.  Connecticut 
is the only state that mandates the consideration of non-shareholder 
interests.44  Furthermore, Connecticut’s mandate only applies if a 
corporation is publicly traded and is undergoing a change of control.45  
Therefore, if North Dakota were to propose changes to its constituency 
statute’s permissive language and mandate consideration of  
non-shareholder interests—as opposed to creating public benefit 
corporations—the state would be a pioneer.  Yet, such an amendment 
would lack a successful model for guidance. 
Even if the permissive language in North Dakota’s constituency statute 
was successfully changed, the statute’s limited applicability is still a 
compelling concern.  Similar to other states, North Dakota’s statute applies 
only to directors and does not include other key corporate participants such 
as agents and officers who are tasked with daily decision-making on behalf 
of the corporation.  According to the statute’s existing language, only 
directors are afforded protection for making decisions that consider  
non-stakeholder interests. 
In contrast, benefit corporations provide more inclusive protection for 
other decision makers through agency theory.  Agency is defined as the 
fiduciary relationship that arises when a principal assents to an agent acting 
on behalf of the principal and the agent accepts.46  Once an agency 
relationship has been created, agents owe various fiduciary duties, including 
duties of loyalty, care, good faith, and fair dealing to the principal.47  By 
including social or environmental concerns as the primary purpose of the 
corporation, public benefit corporations provide protection to agents by 
giving them implicit authority to make socially conscious decisions.  
Officers and agents of such corporations have the implied48 and, in some 
 
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2008) (“[A] director of a corporation which has a class 
of voting stock registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . may 
consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, 
(1) the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the 
shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including the possibility that those interests may be 
best served by the continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation’s 
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations 
including those of any community in which any office or other facility of the corporation is 
located.”). 
45. Id.   
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
47. Id. at § 8.01-08.  
48. Id. at § 2.01 cmt. b (“Implied authority is often used to mean actual authority either (1) to 
do what is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform an agent’s express 
responsibilities or (2) to act in a manner in which an agent believes the principal wishes the agent 
to act . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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instances, the actual authority49 to make decisions in furtherance of the 
corporation’s social objectives.  Consequently, adopting public benefit 
corporation legislation would provide more inclusive agent and employee 
protection for socially conscious decision-making as compared to North 
Dakota’s existing constituency statute that only protects directors. 
A third area of concern regarding constituency statutes is the narrow 
scope of non-shareholder interests protected.  While North Dakota’s list of 
protected shareholder interests is relatively comprehensive and includes 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the economy, the community, 
and society, by specifically listing such interests the language inherently 
limits the non-shareholder interests protected by the statute.50  In contrast, 
benefit corporation legislation provides corporations with more autonomy 
and freedom to create unique and innovative public benefits.  By not listing, 
and therefore limiting, protected interests, public benefit corporation 
legislation provides a broader scope of protected non-shareholder interests.  
For example, benefit legislation provides protection for companies wanting 
to provide “low-income or underserved individuals or communities with 
beneficial products or services.”51  Under the legislation, corporations are 
specifically encouraged to provide beneficial products and services, perhaps 
at lower prices than the consumer is willing to pay.  In contrast, directors 
who prioritize low-income individuals at the expense of shareholders could 
be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duties under Ford’s precedent and 
North Dakota’s existing constituency statute. 
Although North Dakota’s constituency statue is facing the same 
criticisms as other state statutes, the drafters were successful in certain 
regards.  While some constituency statutes apply exclusively to situations 
where corporations are undergoing a takeover or structural changes, North 
Dakota’s statute provides broad applicability, including, but not limited to, 
merger and acquisition contexts.52  North Dakota’s constituency statute also 
has correctly included language that permits both long and short-term 
considerations, as opposed to permitting only short-term interests.53  
Despite these triumphs, however, when read as a whole, North Dakota’s 
 
49. Id. at § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that 
has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the 
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).  
50. Tyler, supra note 40, at 134.  
51. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B Lab 2013).   
52. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 474 (noting that one third of the states limit the statute to the 
takeover and structural changes contexts); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2013) (“[I]ncluding 
the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the 
corporation.”) (emphasis added). 
53. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 462 n.292.   
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statute “merely create[s] the potential for ‘socially responsible directors’ to 
afford some degree of consideration to the effects of decisions on non-
shareholder interests, which is a far cry from being able to prefer non-
shareholder interests over shareholder interests.”54  To conclude that North 
Dakota’s statute overrules the traditional notion of shareholder wealth 
maximization as the first and foremost priority would be to misread the 
statute.55 
Case law does not seem to supplement what the statute is lacking.  In 
Production Credit Association of Fargo v. Ista, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court noted “an officer or director of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to 
the corporation and its stockholders.”56  The court stated that “a director’s 
first duty is to act in all things of trust wholly for the benefit of the 
corporation”57 and continued by citing to the North Dakota Century Code 
section that states a director must act “in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”58  While considering 
what is in the corporation’s best interest, however, the court failed to clarify 
whether a director may prioritize non-shareholder over shareholder 
interests.  Furthermore, the court derived its authority from an 
encyclopaedia that states “directors of a corporation are entrusted with the 
management of its business and property for the benefit of all the 
shareholders and occupy the position of trustees for the collective body of 
shareholders in respect to such business.”59  It is a director’s duty to 
“administer corporate affairs for the common benefit of all the 
shareholders . . . .”60  This language strongly supports the conclusion that 
any non-shareholder interests are subordinate interests. 
As a result, public benefit corporation legislation is still necessary in 
North Dakota despite the existence of a constituency statute.  The current 
statute “lack[s] enforcement mechanisms [and] standing provisions that 
hold directors accountable for inadequately considering non-shareholder 
interests.”61  The result is an expansion of the business judgment 
presumption as a defense mechanism used by directors, as opposed to a 
 
54. Tyler, supra note 40, at 134 (emphasis added).  
55. Id.  
56. 451 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990). 
57. Id. (quoting FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 838 (3d ed. 
1986)). 
58. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1989)). 
59. FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 838 (3d ed. 1986).  
60. Id. 
61. Tyler, supra note 40, at 135. 
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right vested in non-shareholders.62  The statute also does not include any 
requirement that “directors favor or prioritize non-shareholder interests over 
those of shareholders.”63  The result is a statute that affords no general 
protection for directors “motivated by a desire to maximize benefits to  
non-shareholder interests when doing so has no legitimate benefit to 
shareholders.”64 
If a director prioritizes non-shareholder interests over shareholder 
interests and wealth maximization, a director may still be held accountable 
through several means.  The director may still be subject to legal liability 
for breaches of fiduciary duties.  Because shareholders elect directors,65 the 
director may also be removed or passed-up for renewal at the end of his or 
her term.  Director and manager compensation in traditional corporations 
are still linked to share price and other profitability measures.  Therefore, if 
shareholder wealth maximization is not a director’s primary agenda, 
directors may see their compensation suffer.  Finally, directors must also be 
wary of competitors who take market share or pursue takeover strategies 
based on shareholder value as their objective.   
III. ANALYSIS 
In response to the shortcomings in constituency statutes and company 
struggles to fit within the confines of the traditional shareholder wealth 
maximization model, B Lab,66 a non-profit organization has facilitated the 
creation of model benefit corporation legislation.  William H. Clark, Jr., a 
renowned attorney from Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, drafted the “model 
legislation.”67  Some of Clark’s most notable work includes the draft and 
legislation strategy that lead to the enactment of the North Dakota Publicly 
Traded Corporations Act.68  With Clark’s help, North Dakota enacted the 
first state corporation law in the United States that addresses “all of the 
major issues of corporate governance that are of concern to institutional 
investors.”69  In the public benefit corporation arena, Clark has drafted 
 
62. Id. (citing Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders:  Moving Beyond Stakeholder 
Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825 (2003)).  
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 137.   
65. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (2007). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141k(d) 
(2014).  
66. Benefit Corp. Info. Center, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/about-b-
lab. 
67. William H. Clark, Jr., DRINKERBIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/people/ 
attorneys/clark-william-h.  
68. Id. 
69. Id.  
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benefit statutes that have been enacted in seven states, including California 
and New York.70  In light of the shortcomings in North Dakota’s 
constituency statute, the following is a discussion about the model public 
benefit corporation legislation that could be adopted in North Dakota.  The 
model legislation was initially created by Clark, but has “evolved based on 
comments from corporate attorneys in the states in which the legislation has 
been passed or introduced.”71 
A. MODEL LEGISLATION PROVISIONS 
Under the model legislation, public benefit corporations are defined as 
“traditional corporations, incorporated under a state’s general corporate law, 
that have elected to be subject to special provisions that impose stricter 
accountability and transparency requirements and explicitly alter some 
traditional corporate norms.”72  The model legislation only applies to 
corporations that elect to be subject to the regulation; therefore, benefit 
corporations are simultaneously subject to the state’s corporate laws. 
The legislation allows corporations to pursue both specific and general 
public benefits.  Specific public benefits include providing low income 
housing, promoting economic opportunities for individuals and 
communities beyond job creation, protecting the environment, promoting 
the arts and science, funding companies with a purpose to benefit society, 
and improving human health.73  Because specifically listing benefits 
inherently limits the ability of corporations to pursue different missions, the 
legislation differs from constituency statutes by simultaneously allowing 
the pursuit of general public benefits.  General public benefits are defined 
as “material positive impact[s] on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”74  The concept of general public 
benefit requires directors and managers to consider the effects of their 
business actions on society and the environment “as a whole.”75 
General public benefits also help to prevent companies from naming a 
single benefit and then dismissing all other non-financial interests.  For 
example, Company A, with a general public benefit purpose, could not list 
producing affordable widgets as a specific purpose and then dismiss all 
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other stakeholder concerns, such as keeping Company A’s neighboring 
wetland free of toxins produced by its manufacture of widgets.  Under the 
public benefit legislation, Company A would be required to consider 
environmental impacts while pursuing its low-price widget business 
strategy. 
The process of creating a public benefit corporation is similar to the 
existing process of incorporation.  The company must choose a business 
name, obtain a registered agent, reserve the business name, and create an 
article or certificate of incorporation depending on the state of 
incorporation.76  The only difference is that the articles or certificate of 
incorporation must state that the company is a benefit corporation.77  
Existing corporations may also elect to be a public corporation by either 
amending their articles of incorporation or by undergoing a fundamental 
transaction, like a merger or acquisition, with a benefit corporation.78  Both 
amendments and fundamental transactions require a minimum status vote, 
typically a two-thirds supermajority of voting shareholders.79 
A company may terminate its status as a public benefit corporation by 
amending its articles of incorporation to delete the benefit provision or by 
merging or acquiring a non-benefit corporation.80  The legislation provides 
both flexibility and protection for the benefit corporation status by requiring 
the amendment to have the minimum status vote required to have 
established the public benefit corporation status.81  Substantial sales of the 
corporation’s assets will not automatically terminate the status of the 
corporation.82  Rather, such sales will terminate the operation of the 
business—a similar effect to terminating benefit status.83 
Enforcement mechanisms for public benefit corporations that have 
undertaken to maximize outcomes for stakeholders do not come from 
governmental oversight but rather from transparency and accountability 
provisions included in the model legislation.  Public benefit corporations 
are required to “prepare an annual benefit report that assesses . . . 
performance in creating general public benefit against a third-party 
standard . . . . “84  An independent entity develops the third-party standards 
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that assess company compliance in an attempt to provide a protection 
against potential abuse of the benefit corporation status.85  The evaluation 
criteria is publicly available in an attempt provide transparency.86  The 
third-party standard also provides consistency and impartiality by allowing 
the independent entity to develop a niche expertise in assessing corporate 
social performance. 
Public benefit corporations differ from traditional corporations by 
requiring the provision of extensive financial statements and annual benefit 
reports.  Although the Securities Exchange Commission already requires 
substantial financial disclosures, the annual benefit report is required 
because a corporation’s success in creating general or specific public 
benefits is not always readily determinable from financial statements.  The 
report is intended to reduce “greenwashing,” a phenomenon of businesses 
trying to portray themselves as being more environmentally and socially 
responsible then they are in reality.87  It provides both consumers and the 
general public a way of evaluating whether businesses are fulfilling their 
corporate social responsibility claims. 
The annual benefit report also allows shareholders to hold directors 
accountable.  Because shareholders are responsible for electing a 
corporation’s board of directors, the report is a resource shareholders can 
use to decide whether directors should be retained or dismissed.  More 
importantly, unlike the typical derivative action, the model legislation 
creates “benefit enforcement proceedings” whereby shareholders can bring 
suit for a corporation’s failure to pursue or create the public benefits 
enumerated in the articles of incorporation.88  Although in theory 
shareholders can bring derivative actions against directors for failing to 
pursue social missions, shareholders would have difficulty successfully 
arguing that a director breached a fiduciary duty by maximizing shareholder 
profits. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
As exemplified above, the model legislation has several provisions that 
differ from traditional principles and theories of corporate law.  
Consequently, if enacted, the provisions would have both intended and 
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legal and business implications while highlighting meritorious critiques of 
the proposed legislation. 
1. Legal Implications 
Benefit corporations are particularly enticing for states without 
constituency statutes in liquidity scenarios.  As a result of Revlon, directors’ 
protection by the business judgment rule is narrowed, requiring directors to 
take the highest offer regardless of the decision’s impact on non-financial 
stakeholder interests.89  Although North Dakota has a constituency statute, 
the state may still reap the benefits of the model legislation.  Due to the lack 
of case law in all circuits, North Dakota lawyers and the directors and 
officers they counsel are provided with little clarity about how a court 
would rule if, during liquidation, a director “made a decision based on 
broader considerations than just the highest offer.”90 
The legislation also affects director fiduciary duties.  While the 
business judgment rule affords directors some degree of deference in 
considering non-financial interests, decision-making is still constrained to 
shareholder wealth maximization.  As exemplified by Ford, directors must 
take care to frame a decision that considers non-financial interests to appear 
as a decision that increases share value.  Whether discussing these decisions 
in board meetings with discoverable minutes or subsequently justifying 
these decisions in court, directors and officers must, at minimum, carefully 
select their language to characterize the decision as eventually beneficial to 
share price.  While constituency statutes afford greater protection for 
directors, they do little for companies, employees, consumers, and 
shareholders who want to require, rather than just permit, directors to 
consider non-financial interests. 
2. Business Implications 
While legal constraints play an important role in director and officer 
decision-making, corporate culture can play an even larger role.  Generally, 
“shareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate 
goal in American business circles.”91  This norm is deeply embedded within 
American corporate culture and tradition.  Therefore, despite the existence 
of some business judgment protection and the permissive language of 
constituency statutes, directors, officers, and many lawyers believe their 
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actions are constrained to solely acting in furtherance of shareholder 
interests.92  Of those directors who believe social responsibility is 
important, several believe that the social responsibility of business is solely 
to increase profits.93  Although case law such as Revlon and constituency 
statutes aid in changing these beliefs, the lingering effects of the rigid 
wealth maximization mindset act as a cultural impediment to actual 
corporate social responsibility.  Creating a new corporate form that requires 
directors and officers to consider stakeholder interests can help to remove 
this impediment. 
Opponents of the legislation argue that a company choosing to 
incorporate as a public benefit corporation is an unviable and unsustainable 
business model.94  Such pundits argue that being a public benefit 
corporation limits a company’s ability to raise capital because investors are 
unlikely to invest in companies that are unwilling and unable to prioritize 
their interests.95  In response, proponents of the legislation argue that the 
demand for socially responsible employers, products, and investment 
opportunities has indicated otherwise.96  Given recent scandals in both the 
non-profit and for-profit sectors, some investors prefer to fund companies 
that focus on long-term sustainability and transparency.  Investors view 
corporations with strong governance practices as sound investment 
opportunities and are willing to invest in these companies despite the fact 
that their short-term interests may be subordinate to sustainable  
decision-making.  The United States Forum for Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment quantified this demand in its 2014 report on United 
States Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends.97  According 
to the Forum, “the total US-domiciled assets under management using 
[sustainable, responsible and impact investing] strategies expanded from 
$3.74 trillion at the start of 2012 to $6.57 trillion at the start of 2014, an 
increase of 76 percent.”98  Key drivers of this trend include the increasing 
incorporation of environmental, social, and governance factors in money 
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data for the report, eighty percent of these money managers cited client 
demand as their motivation for including these factors. 
Proponents would also argue that the legislation has already been 
proven to be a viable business model.100  Currently, there are 780 benefit 
corporations incorporated across the country.101  Some of the more notable 
corporations include multinationals like Home Care Associates, Method 
Products, Patagonia, Plum, Greyston Bakery, and the Rasmussen 
Colleges.102 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
There are several critiques of the model benefit corporation legislation 
and many are meritorious.  Commentators have characterized such 
legislation as untested, ambiguous, and uncertain.103  Pundits have also 
criticized this legislation for a “perceived lack of director accountability and 
enforcement mechanisms . . . .”104  In states like Michigan and North 
Carolina, legislators and lobbies defeated this proposed legislation by 
“claim[ing] that benefit corporations create a false dichotomy between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ business.”105  Other critics argue that benefit corporations 
are “unnecessary and that current corporate law is adequate to 
accommodate mission-driven businesses . . . .”106  These critics may have 
merit, just as the legislation may have value. 
There is an ongoing debate as to the necessity and value of adopting 
public benefit corporation legislation.  Lawyers, business people, and 
legislators across the country continue to weigh the pros and cons of the 
new corporate form.  Others choose to wait and watch states that have 
adopted the legislation.  Given the complexity of the issue, this note is not 
intended to provide a conclusive answer as to whether the corporate form is 
definitively right or wrong for North Dakota.  Rather, it should serve as a 
mechanism for highlighting some of the existing gaps in North Dakota’s 
corporate laws.  Discussing public benefit corporation legislation is an 
interesting approach to resolving some of these short-comings. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
In 2007, North Dakota “enacted the nation’s most shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance law” in a battle against other states for companies 
seeking to incorporate.107  Delaware is well established as the most popular 
state for incorporation and is subsequently North Dakota’s largest 
competitor.  Although Delaware, like North Dakota, prides itself on being a 
shareholder-friendly state, Delaware amended its corporate law to include 
public benefit corporations on August 1, 2013.108  Delaware has recognized 
the gaps in existing corporate law and pursued the public benefit 
corporation as a possible solution.  Delaware’s approach is to attract 
companies by affording incorporators with increased flexibility.  Delaware 
is a leader in corporate law.  As a state that is undergoing increased 
economic expansion and is receiving increased investment, North Dakota 
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